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Abstract
We study Differential Privacy in the abstract setting of Probability on
metric spaces. Numerical, categorical and functional data can be handled
in a uniform manner in this setting. We demonstrate how mechanisms
based on data sanitisation and those that rely on adding noise to query
responses fit within this framework. We prove that once the sanitisation
is differentially private, then so is the query response for any query. We
show how to construct sanitisations for high-dimensional databases using
simple 1-dimensional mechanisms. We also provide lower bounds on the
expected error for differentially private sanitisations in the general metric
space setting. Finally, we consider the question of sufficient sets for differ-
ential privacy and show that for relaxed differential privacy, any algebra
generating the Borel σ-algebra is a sufficient set for relaxed differential
privacy.
Keywords: Differential Privacy; Metric Space; Categorical Data; Func-
tional Data; Data Sanitisation
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
The rapid expansion of the Internet and its use in everyday life, alongside the
growing understanding of the potential benefits of big data [4], has pushed
data privacy to the forefront of research priorities since the turn of the millen-
nium. Whether it be online, in the supermarket or at the hospital, corporations
and governments are collecting vast quantities of data about our activities, the
choices we make and the people we are in order to work more efficiently, increase
profits and better serve our needs as consumers and citizens [5]. The challenge
of making this potentially highly sensitive data publicly available where it can
be put to good use is far from trivial and it is with this problem that the field
of data privacy is concerned.
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Various researchers and practitioners have considered applying anonymisa-
tion techniques to data sets such as removing explicit identifiers (name, address,
telephone number, social security number, etc) while leaving quasi-identifiers1
in place. While these anonymised data sets do indeed preserve participants’
privacy in isolation, auxiliary/background information make this technique ex-
tremely vulnerable to attack [22]. A study by L. Sweeney in 2000 [28] found that
as much as 87% of the US population (216 out of 248 million people) could be
uniquely identified using only three quasi-identifiers (5-digit ZIP code, gender
and date of birth). This meant census data could be linked to “anonymised”
health records to determine the health status of unsuspecting patients.
Then in 2006, American media firm AOL released 20 million Internet search
queries, with user numbers in place of other quasi-identifiers to protect users’
identity. This shield of anonymity was not sufficient for privacy to be protected
however, and the data was quickly removed from the public domain [2]. Simi-
larly in 2008, A. Narayanan and V. Shmatikov [26] successfully de-anonymised
entries in an anonymised data set containing movie ratings of 500,000 sub-
scribers which was released by movie streaming website Netflix. The authors
used the publicly-available Internet Movie Database as background information
and were able to positively identify known users despite the absence of explicit
identifiers in the Netflix data set. Initial anonymisation methods such as k-
anonymity [29] and l-diversity [22] have been shown to be vulnerable to attacks
based on background information [22, 21]. This fact has led to the development
of a wide variety of more sophisticated approaches to publishing and mining
data anonymously [23, 24, 25].
The work discussed above underlines the unsatisfactory nature of ad-hoc
privacy solutions and the need for a solid theoretical foundation for privacy re-
search. With this in mind, the concept of differential privacy was proposed in [8]
to provide a formal, mathematical framework for analysing privacy-preserving
data publishing and mining. The premise of differential privacy is that the
outputs of queries to a database are unlikely to change substantially with the
addition of a new participant’s information. This means that outputs will be
similar whether or not an individual participates in the database.
There is now a considerable body of work on differential privacy in the the-
oretical Computer Science literature [9]. Many of the paper in the literature
concern data or queries of some particular type or on the development of par-
ticular algorithms that satisfy differential privacy. For instance, the design of
differentially private algorithms for calculating singular vectors is considered in
[10], while differentially private recommender systems are developed in [11]; in
both of these instance, the data are naturally modelled as real numbers. Algo-
rithms for search problems and learning are considered in [12, 13]. A statistical
perspective on differential privacy was developed in [14]; this paper considered
real-valued ([0, 1] in fact) queries and data. In [15], mechanisms that max-
imise a suitable utility function were investigated; this paper assumed discrete
finite-valued data spaces, which can of course describe categorical data. The
recent paper [16] addressed the problem of optimal mechanisms that add noise
independent of the data; the queries considered are real-valued. To date, the
only major reference on differential privacy for functional data appears to be
1A quasi-identifier is an attribute that is not sufficient to identify an individual by itself,
but can do so when combined with other quasi-identifiers (e.g. gender, date of birth, etc.).
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[18]; in the same paper the authors emphasise the importance of being careful
in selecting the measure space with respect to which probabilities are defined.
In particular, if we choose our σ-algebra to be the trivial one consisting of the
empty set and the entire space, then every mechanism is differentially private.
The work of [20] and other similar papers on lower bounds for differentially pri-
vate mechanisms considers real (or in some cases integer) valued data. Our aim
is to describe a unifying framework for all major data and query types consid-
ered so far and to initiate a study of differential privacy in the formal setting of
probability measures on metric spaces. This provides the machinery necessary
for a rigorous discussion of random mechanisms and their accuracy. The major
aims of the paper are to place the study of differentially private mechanisms
within the framework of probability measures on metric spaces and to present
some initial results in this direction.
1.2 Our Results
The principal contributions of this paper are the following.
• We consider differential privacy in the general framework of probability on
metric spaces and highlight that it can be seamlessly applied to numerical,
categorical and functional data.
• Our description shows how mechanisms based on database sanitisation
and adding noise to query responses can be treated in a unified fashion.
• We describe techniques for generating families of (ǫ, δ) differentially pri-
vate mechanisms from simpler mechanisms. One such example is given
by sanitisation mechanisms generated from an (ǫ, δ) differentially private
mechanism for the identity query. We also show how to generate differ-
entially private mechanisms for high-dimensional databases using mecha-
nisms for 1-dimensional databases.
• We describe lower bounds for the error in releasing a database in an (ǫ, δ)-
differentially private fashion using product sanitisations. This result ap-
plies to data drawn from any metric space in contrast to previous work,
which has largely focussed on real and integer valued data.
• We consider the question of testing differential privacy and describe suffi-
cient sets for (ǫ, δ) differential privacy.
1.3 Structure of paper
We begin in Section 2 by establishing the measure-theoretic framework for dif-
ferential privacy. We then consider the question of sufficient sets for differential
privacy in Section 3, address sanitisation mechanisms in Section 4 and focus on
product sanitisations in Section 5. Section 6 considers accuracy and we give
concluding remarks in Section 7.
2 Preliminaries
We first recall some standard concepts and results from probability and measure
theory [3, 27]. Given an algebra S of subsets of a set Ω, we use σ(S) to denote
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the smallest σ-algebra containing S and refer to σ(S) as the σ-algebra generated
by S. A set Ω together with a σ-algebra of subsets of Ω is a measurable space.
A monotone classM of subsets of some set Ω is defined by the following two
properties: (i) if {Ai}∞i=1 ⊆ M, and if Ai ⊆ Ai+1 for all i, then
⋃∞
i=1 Ai ∈ M;
(ii) if {Ai}∞i=1 ⊆M, and if Ai ⊇ Ai+1 for all i, then
⋂∞
i=1 Ai ∈M.
The next result, which appears as Theorem 3.4 in [3], characterises σ(S) as
the smallest monotone class containing S.
Theorem 1 Let S be an algebra of subsets of some set Ω and let M be a
monotone class such that S ⊆M. Then σ(S) ⊆M.
Given two measurable spaces (X,AX) and (Y,AY ), subsets of X × Y of the
form
R =
p⋃
i=1
Xi × Yi,
where Xi ∈ AX , Yi ∈ AY for 1 ≤ i ≤ p and (Xi × Yi) ∩ (Xj × Yj) = ∅ for i 6= j
are known as elementary subsets. Let R denote the collection of all elementary
subsets and denote the usual product σ-algebra on X × Y by AX×Y . The
following result is Theorem 8.3 of [27].
Theorem 2 If M is a monotone class and R ⊆M, then AX×Y ⊆M.
Finally, for a measure µ on a measurable space (X,AX), we recall the fol-
lowing simple fact.
Proposition 1 Suppose that {Ai}∞i=1 ⊆ AX satisfies Ai ⊆ Ai+1 for all i, then
limi→∞ µ(Ai) = µ (
⋃∞
i=1Ai).
Similarly, if Ai ⊇ Ai+1 for all i, then limi→∞ µ(Ai) = µ (
⋂∞
i=1Ai).
2.1 Database Model
The individual entries of the databases we consider are elements of a set D ⊆ U
where U is a metric space with metric ρ. We equip U with the Borel σ-algebra
generated by the open sets in U (in the metric topology); D then naturally
inherits a σ-algebra AD. A database d with n rows is given by a vector d =
(d1, . . . , dn) ∈ Dn in which di ∈ D is the ith row. Throughout, we assume that
Un (and Dn) is equipped with the usual product σ-algebra AUn generated by
{A1 × · · · × An : Ai ∈ AU}. This ensures that projection maps πi : Un → U
given by πi(x1, . . . , xn) = xi are measurable.
It is worth highlighting the generality of this setting: the metric space D can
contain numerical, categorical or functional data; moreover, it can be discrete
or continuous.
Example 1 If our data concern the hobbies or interests of people, we consider
a set of all possible hobbies, denoted by H. For simplicity it is not unreasonable
to assume that H is finite. Our data entries are then drawn from the power
set D := 2H of H, which will again be a finite set. There are various natural
choices of metric in this case. We could consider the discrete metric on D in
which ρ1(A,B) = 1 if A 6= B and 0 otherwise. Alternatively, we could choose
the metric given by symmetric distance: ρ2(A,B) = |(A ∪ B)\(A ∩ B)|. In
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both of these cases, the Borel σ-algebra consists of all subset of D. Note that
there is no requirement that each entry in a database in Dn have the same size
or cardinality, reflecting the fact that not all of us have the same number of
interests or hobbies.
Example 2 In readings from field deployed sensors, each reading has a time-
stamp giving rise to time-course data. Another example is in smart metering
where the supplier collects data from consumers giving electriciy consumption
over a time-window. Data of this type is naturally represented as either a func-
tion or a sequence of real numbers. In our framework, we can take U to be
a sequence space such as l∞ or l2, or an appropriate function space such as
C([0, T ]) or L2([0, T ]), where T represents the billing period (for instance). All
of these spaces have natural norms defined on them (in fact they are all Banach
spaces) and can be equipped with the Borel σ-algebra generated from the open
sets in the norm topology.
We say that two databases d = (d1, . . . , dn) and d
′ = (d′1, . . . , d
′
n) in D
n are
neighbours, and write d ∼ d′, if there is some j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that dj 6= d′j
and di = d
′
i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {j}. More generally, we denote by h(d,d
′)
the Hamming distance between d and d′.
Remark: While we present our results for Hamming distance on Dn, the
results of Sections 3 and 4 are also valid with respect to other metrics ρ on Dn
where we define d ∼ d′ if ρ(d,d′) = 1. The work of Sections 5 and 6 relies on
similarity being defined with respect to Hamming distance however.
For the most part, we assume that the data space D is compact. This is
immediate if D is finite (as in Example 1) and is a natural assumption in most
realistic situations. When D is compact, we denote by diam(D) the diameter
of D:
diam(D) = max
d,d′∈D
ρ(d, d′). (1)
2.2 Query Model
We consider a very general query model. The set of all possible responses is
assumed to be a metric space EQ with metric ρQ and equipped with the Borel
σ-algebra AQ. The query is then a measurable function, Q : Un → EQ and
hence Q−1(A) ∈ AUn for all A ∈ AQ.
Example 3 As with the data in d, queries are not restricted to take numerical
values in this setting. For instance, if we consider Example 1 above, then we
could consider a query asking for the number of people in the database who are
interested in Classical Music or Football for instance: this would clearly be a
numeric query. On the other hand, we could also request the 3 most common
hobbies in the database, the output of which would be a set.
We next formally introduce the concept of a response mechanism within this
general framework. Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space. Given a collection of
queries Q(n), a response mechanism is a set of measurable mappings
{XQ,d : Ω→ EQ | Q ∈ Q(n)}. (2)
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Note that XQ,d is an EQ-valued random variable for each Q and d.
Sanitised Response Mechanisms
If there exists some family
{Xd : Ω→ U
n}
of measurable mappings such that
XQ,d = Q ◦Xd (3)
for all d ∈ Dn, then the mechanism given by (3) is a sanitised response mecha-
nism. The motivation behind this choice of terminology is that the mechanism is
generated by sanitising the database via the random variable Xd before answer-
ing the query Q, i.e. non-interactive data release. If the database is sanitised
by adding appropriate noise, the mapping Xd takes the form Xd = d +N for
some Un-valued random vector N . Clearly, in order to define a mechanism by
adding noise, it is necessary for Un to have a suitable algebraic structure: a
vector space or monoid for example.
Output Perturbations
Mechanisms that provide Differential Privacy by perturbing the query re-
sponse can be described as follows. Let a query Q : Un → EQ be given. Assume
that there is a family of measurable functions {Xq : Ω → EQ | q ∈ EQ}. The
output perturbation mechanism is defined as
XQ,d = XQ(d) (4)
In situations involving real-valued data, Xq typically takes the form Xq = q+N
where N represents the noise added to the query response. For set-valued
queries, Xq can be defined by specifying some probability mass function on the
collection of possible query responses.
2.3 Differential Privacy
In the interest of completeness and clarity, we now recall the definition of Dif-
ferential Privacy and write it in the setting of this paper.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy with Respect to a Query) Let ǫ ≥ 0,
0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 be given. A response mechanism is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private with
respect to a query Q0 ∈ Q(n) if for all d ∼ d′ ∈ Dn and all A ∈ AQ0 ,
P(XQ0,d ∈ A) ≤ e
ǫ
P(XQ0,d′ ∈ A) + δ. (5)
It is important to note that the relation d ∼ d′ is symmetric, so inequality (5)
is required to hold when d and d′ are swapped.
Definition 2 (Differential Privacy) A response mechanism is (ǫ, δ)-differentially
private with respect to Q(n) if it is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private with respect to
every query Q0 ∈ Q(n).
The above definitions are often referred to as relaxed differential privacy; the
original notion of differential privacy introduced in [8] considers the case where
δ = 0.
The expected error of a mechanism (2) for a query Q on a database d is
given by the expectation E[dist(XQ,d, Q(d))].
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3 Sufficient Sets for Differential Privacy
In this brief section, we consider the following question: is there a strict subset
S of AQ such that if (5) is satisfied for all A in S, it is guaranteed to be satisfied
for all A in AQ? We refer to such a set as a sufficient set for differential privacy.
Depending on the application, the query output space may be a subset of
R
n or of a sequence or function space such as C([0, T ]). A key question for the
practical deployment of differentially private mechanisms is how to determine
if a mechanism is in fact (ǫ, δ)-differentially private. Testing (5) on the entire
σ-algebra is clearly a prohibitively difficult task. Our next result shows that it
is sufficient to test this condition on any algebra S ⊂ AQ that generates AQ.
Theorem 3 Let a response mechanism (2) and a query (EQ,AQ, Q) be given
and let S ⊂ AQ be an algebra such that σ(S) = AQ. If (5) holds for all sets
A ∈ S, then it holds for all sets A ∈ AQ.
Proof: Let B denote the collection of sets in EQ for which (5) holds. By
assumption, S ⊆ B. Now let A1, A2, . . . be any collection of sets in B with
Ai ⊆ Ai+1 for all i. Define A¯ := ∪iAi and let d,d′ ∈ Dn with d ∼ d′ be given.
As each Ai ∈ B, it follows that
P(XQ,d(ω) ∈ Ai) ≤ e
ǫ
P(XQ,d′(ω) ∈ Ai) + δ
for all i. As the sequence Ai is increasing, it now follows from Proposition 1
that
P(XQ,d(ω) ∈ A¯) = lim
i→∞
P(XQ,d(ω) ∈ Ai)
≤ eǫ lim
i→∞
P(XQ,d′(ω) ∈ Ai) + δ
= eǫP(XQ,d′(ω) ∈ A¯) + δ,
and so A¯ ∈ B. An identical argument shows that for any sequence {Ai} of sets
in B with Ai ⊇ Ai+1 for all i, and A¯ = ∩iAi, A¯ ∈ B. Taken together these two
observations imply that B is a monotone class. Moreover, S ⊆ B. The result
now follows immediately from Theorem 1.
In the next example we show how Theorem 3 can be applied to differentially
private mechanisms for functional data to obtain results such as those described
in Section 3.1 of [18].
Example 4 Suppose our query Q takes values in the space C([0, 1]) of continu-
ous functions on [0, 1] equipped with the norm ‖f‖∞ = sup{|f(t)| : t ∈ [0, 1]} and
the σ-algebra AQ of Borel sets generated by the norm topology. Let a mechanism
XQ,d be given. Then XQ,d(ω) is in C([0, 1]) for each ω ∈ Ω.
Given a positive integer k and real numbers 0 ≤ t1 < · · · < tk ≤ 1, consider
the projection πt1,...,tk : C([0, 1])→ R
k given by
πt1,...,tk(f) = (f(t1), . . . , f(tk)).
These mappings are measurable with respect to the usual Borel σ-algebra on Rk
and hence we can define the Rk-valued mechanism Xt1,...tkQ,d = πt1,...,tk ◦XQ,d.
We claim that if the finite-dimensional mechanisms Xt1,...tkQ,d are (ǫ, δ)-differentially
private for all k and t1, . . . , tk, then the mechanism XQ,d is (ǫ, δ)-differentially
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private. The argument to show this is as follows. From the assumption on
the finite-dimensional mechanisms, it follows immediately that (5) holds for all
(so-called cylinder sets) sets A of the form
A = π−1t1,...,tk(B)
where B is a Borel set in Rk. These sets form an algebra and it follows from
Theorem VII.2.1 (page 212) of [17] that the σ-algebra they generate is the Borel
σ-algebra of C([0, 1]). It follows immediately from Theorem 3 that XQ,d defines
an (ǫ, δ)-differentially private mechanism on C([0, 1]) as claimed.
4 Sanitisation Mechanisms and the Identity Query
A popular approach to designing differentially private response mechanisms is
to add noise to the query response Q(d). It is known however, that this can lead
to privacy compromises by averaging a large number of responses to an identical
query [9], unless the number or type of queries that can be asked is restricted.
We now show that if a sanitisation mechanism (3) is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private
with respect to the identity query, then it is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private with
respect to any query. It is important to appreciate that we place no restrictions
on the query Q; it could map into a sequence space such as l∞ and represent
an infinite sequence of individual queries for example.
The identity query is defined by the identity map on the ambient space
Un. In sanitised response mechanisms, the “perturbed database” Xd(ω) is
disclosed by the response to the identity query. However, disclosing Xd(ω)
need not disclose the original database d provided that an appropriate privacy-
preserving perturbation has been applied. Importantly, if (ǫ, δ)-differential pri-
vacy is achieved with respect to query In, then the response to any query is
(ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
Theorem 4 (Identity Query) Consider a sanitised response mechanism as
defined in (3). Suppose this response mechanism is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private
with respect to the identity query. Then it is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private with
respect to any query (EQ,AQ, Q).
Proof: Let d,d′ be two elements of Dn with d ∼ d′. By assumption,
P(Xd(ω) ∈ E) ≤ e
ǫ
P(Xd′(ω) ∈ E) + δ, (6)
for all E ∈ AUn . Let a query (EQ, Q,AQ) and A ∈ AQ be given. As Q is
measurable, Q−1(A) ∈ AUn . Then, using (6),
P(XQ,d(ω) ∈ A) = P(Q(Xd(ω)) ∈ A)
= P(Xd(ω) ∈ Q
−1(A))
≤ eǫP(Xd′(ω) ∈ Q
−1(A)) + δ
= P(Q(Xd′(ω)) ∈ A) + δ.
Thus, the mechanism satisfies (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy with respect to Q also.
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Corollary 1 Consider a sanitised response mechanism as defined in (3) and
suppose In ∈ Q(n). Then this response mechanism is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private
with respect to In if and only if it is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private with respect to
every query Q ∈ Q(n).
Proof: “⇒”: Theorem 4.
“⇐”: The response mechanism is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private with respect to
every query Q ∈ Q(n) by assumption, therefore it must be (ǫ, δ)-differentially
private with respect to the identity query In, since In ∈ Q(n).
Observe that the number and details of queries Q ∈ Q(n) do not need to be
specified in advance for Theorem 4 to hold, and so queries may be interactive
and unlimited in number. This highlights a fundamental difference between
privacy mechanisms that perturb the query response (e.g. by adding Lapla-
cian or Gaussian noise) vs privacy mechanisms that perturb the database itself.
Namely, in the former the added noise can be averaged out by an adversary
repeating a query multiple times, thereby requiring a limit to be placed on the
number of queries allowed, while in the latter an averaging attack of this sort is
impossible; a repeated query will simply receive the same answer each time.
5 Product Sanitisations
In this section, we derive a result that relates differentially private sanitisation-
based mechanisms for n-dimensional databases in Dn to mechanisms for simple
1-dimensional databases.
Before showing how differentially private sanitisation mechanisms for databases
in Dn can be constructed from simple mechanisms for databases in D, we first
establish a number of technical results.
Lemma 1 Let A1, . . . , Ap, B1, . . . , Bp be two collections of non-empty sets.
Then the finite union
⋃p
i=1(Ai ×Bi) can be written as
p⋃
i=1
(Ai ×Bi) =
⋃
I⊆{1,...,p}
(A˜I × B˜I),
where A˜I =
⋃
i∈I Ai and B˜I =
⋂
i∈I Bi \
⋃
i/∈I Bi. Moreover, B˜I ∩ B˜J = ∅ for
all I 6= J .
Proof: We need to prove equality and disjointness of the decomposition.
Let (a, b) ∈
⋃p
i=1(Ai ×Bi). Then there exists at least one i
∗ such that (a, b) ∈
Ai∗ ×Bi∗ . Let Ib := {i : b ∈ Bi} ⊆ {1, . . . , p} (note i∗ ∈ Ib). Then b ∈
⋂
i∈Ib
Bi,
but b /∈ Bj for any j /∈ Ib, otherwise j would be an element of Ib. Hence
b ∈
⋂
i∈Ib
Bi \
⋃
i/∈Ib
Bi. Also a ∈
⋃
i∈Ib
Ai since a ∈ Ai∗ . Hence (a, b) ∈⋃
I⊆{1,...,p}
(⋃
i∈I Ai ×
⋂
i∈I Bi \
⋃
i/∈I Bi
)
.
Let (a, b) ∈
⋃
I⊆{1,...,p}
(⋃
i∈I Ai ×
⋂
i∈I Bi \
⋃
i/∈I Bi
)
. Then there exists at
least one I∗ ⊆ {1, . . . , p} such that (a, b) ∈
⋃
i∈I∗ Ai ×
⋂
i∈I∗ Bi \
⋃
i/∈I∗ Bi.
Hence a ∈ Ai for at least one i ∈ I
∗ and b ∈ Bi for all i ∈ I
∗ and so there exists
at least one i ∈ I∗ such that (a, b) ∈ Ai ×Bi and so (a, b) ∈
⋃p
i=1(Ai ×Bi).
Finally, we show that B˜I ∩ B˜J = ∅ if I 6= J . To see this, note that if I 6= J ,
then we can without loss of generality assume that there is some index k ∈ I
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that is not in J . Then any x ∈ B˜I must be in Bk. However, as k ∈ JC , it follows
that x ∈ ∪i/∈JBk and hence that x /∈ BJ . This shows that the intersection is
empty as claimed.
For future use, we note that an analogous argument to that given above can
be used to show the following.
Lemma 2 Let A1, . . . , Ap, B1, . . . , Bp be two collections of non-empty sets.
Then the finite union
⋃p
i=1(Ai ×Bi) can be written as
q⋃
j=1
(A˜j × B˜j),
where A˜i ∩ A˜j = ∅ for i 6= j.
For the remainder of this section we consider a special form for the database
sanitisation Xd(ω). Suppose a family {Xd : Ω → U | d ∈ D} of measurable
mappings is given. Define the mechanism Xd for d = (d1, . . . , dn) by
Xd(ω) =
(
X1d(ω), . . . , X
n
d (ω)
)
, (7)
where the X i
d
are independent and X i
d
has the same distribution as Xdi, for all
d ∈ dn, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
We first note the following lemma concerning such mechanisms.
Lemma 3 Let a family {Xd : Ω→ U | d ∈ D} of measurable mappings be given
and let Xd be defined by (7). If Xd is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private then
P(Xd ∈ A) ≤ e
ǫ
P(Xd′ ∈ A) + δ,
for all d, d′ ∈ D,A ∈ AU .
Proof: Let d, d′ in D be given. If d = d′, the result is trivial. If d 6= d′,
take d = (d, d2, . . . , dn), d
′ = (d′, d2, . . . , dn) for any choice of d2, . . . , dn in D.
As Xd is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private and the projection π1 : U
n → U onto the
first coordinate is measurable, it follows that for A ∈ AU :
P(Xd ∈ A) = P(π1(Xd) ∈ A)
= P(Xd ∈ π
−1
1 (A))
≤ eǫP(Xd′ ∈ π
−1
1 (A)) + δ
= eǫP(Xd′ ∈ A) + δ.
We next note that the converse of this result also holds.
Theorem 5 Consider a family {Xd : Ω→ U | d ∈ D} of measurable mappings
and assume that
P(Xd ∈ A) ≤ e
ǫ
P(Xd′ ∈ A) + δ,
for all d, d′ ∈ D,A ∈ AU . Let Xd be as defined in (7). Then,
P(Xd ∈ A) ≤ e
ǫ
P(Xd′ ∈ A) + δ,
for all d ∼ d′ ∈ Dn and all A ∈ AUn .
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Proof: We shall use induction on n. By assumption, the result is true for
n = 1. Let n > 1 be given and assume that the result is true for all k ≤ n− 1.
Assume that d and d′ differ in the first element so d1 6= d
′
1 but dj = d
′
j for
j 6= 1. Let
R =
p⋃
i=1
(Ai ×Bi), (8)
where Ai ∈ AU , Bi ∈ AUn−1 , be given. It follows from Lemma 1 that we can
write
R =
q⋃
i=1
(A˜i × B˜i), (9)
where A˜i ∈ AU , B˜i ∈ AUn−1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ q and B˜i∩B˜j = ∅ for i 6= j. Then, using
the fact that the sets B˜i are disjoint and the independence of the components
of Xd, Xd′ ,
P(Xd ∈ R)
=
q∑
i=1
P(Xd ∈ A˜i × B˜i)
=
q∑
i=1
P(Xd1 ∈ A˜i)P(X(d2,...,dn) ∈ B˜i)
≤
q∑
i=1
(
eǫP(Xd′
1
∈ A˜i) + δ
)
P(X(d′
2
,...,d′
n
) ∈ B˜i)
= eǫ
q∑
i=1
P(Xd′ ∈ A˜i × B˜i) + δ P
(
X(d′
2
,...,d′
n
) ∈
q⋃
i=1
B˜i
)
≤ eǫP(Xd′ ∈ R) + δ.
If d1 = d
′
1, then (d2, . . . , dn) ∼ (d
′
2, . . . , d
′
n) and we can use Lemma 2 and the
induction hypothesis to conclude that
P(Xd ∈ R)
≤
q∑
i=1
P(Xd′
1
∈ A˜i)
(
eǫP(X(d′
2
,...,d′
n
) ∈ B˜i) + δ
)
= eǫ
q∑
i=1
P(Xd′ ∈ A˜i × B˜i) + δ P
(
Xd′
1
∈
q⋃
i=1
A˜i
)
≤ eǫP(Xd′ ∈ R) + δ.
Thus for any set R of the form (8), we can conclude that
P(Xd ∈ R) ≤ e
ǫ
P(Xd′ ∈ R) + δ. (10)
In particular, (10) holds for all elementary sets R ∈ ADn . A similar argument to
that used in the proof of Theorem 3 shows that the collection of all sets satisfying
(10) is a monotone class; furthermore this collection of subsets contains the
elementary sets. The result now follows from Theorem 2.
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Remark: In the following subsection, we describe some simple applications
of Theorem 5. It is worth noting that it applies to any database space D ⊆ U ,
and to discrete spaces in particular. For mechanisms of the form (7), it simplifies
the task of testing the mechanism for differential privacy considerably. For
instance, if D is a finite set with |D| elements, then it is only necessary to
check (5) for all
(
|D|
2
)
pairs of elements of D and all 2|D| subsets of D to ensure
differential privacy on Dn. In general, we would have n
(
|D|
2
)
|D|n−1 pairs of
neighbouring elements and 2|D|
n
subsets to worry about!
5.1 Examples
Example 5 Inspired by a now standard approach to designing differentially
private mechanisms, we first consider a sanitisation mechanism for real-valued
databases in which Laplacian noise is added to each element of the database.
Recall that a Laplacian random variable X : Ω→ R with mean zero and variance
2b2 has a probability density function (PDF) is given by
f(x) =
1
2b
e−
|x|
b .
Let D ⊂ R be bounded; for each d ∈ D, let Xd(ω) = d+L(ω) where L : Ω→
R is a Laplacian random variable with mean zero and variance 2b2 such that
b ≥
diam(D)
ǫ− log(1− δ)
.
The resulting sanitised response mechanism corresponding to (7) is (ǫ, δ)-differentially
private for any database in Dn.
To see this, note that by Theorem 5, it is sufficient to show that∫
A
e−
|x−d|
b
2b
dx ≤ eǫ
∫
A
e−
|x−d′|
b
2b
dx+ δ,
for all d, d′ ∈ D,A ∈ B(R), where B(R) denotes the Borel σ-algebra on the real
line R. Using the triangle inequality, |x− d′| ≤ |x− d|+ |∆| where ∆ = d′ − d,
and so it is sufficient to show that∫
A
e−
|x−d|
b
2b
dx ≤ eǫ−
|d′−d|
b
∫
A
e−
|x−d|
b
2b
dx+ δ,
for all d′, d ∈ D,A ∈ B(R). This last inequality will follow if 1 ≤ eǫ−
|∆|
b + δ or
b ≥ |∆|ǫ−log(1−δ) for all ∆ ∈ {d
′ − d : d′, d ∈ D}.
Of course, keeping in mind that the l1 sensitivity of the identity query [9] is
precisely given by diam(D), this example can be seen as an application of the
well-known Laplacian mechanism to the identity query.
Example 6 Consider again our earlier example where D = 2H represents the
sets of possible hobbies or interests of people. As noted earlier, it is reasonable
to assume that D contains finitely many elements; we denote |D| = m+1. Fol-
lowing Theorem 5 we will construct a mechanism for 1-dimensional databases:
this can then be used to define a mechanism for databases in Dn via (7).
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For d ∈ D, consider the D-valued random variable Xd with probability mass
function:
P(Xd = d) = 1− pm, P(Xd = d
′) = p,
where d 6= d′ ∈ D. We make the reasonable assumption that 1− pm > p.
For (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, we need the following to hold:
P(Xd ∈ A) ≤ e
ǫ
P(Xd′ ∈ A) + δ, (11)
where A ⊆ D and d, d′ ∈ D.
We claim that (11) will hold if and only if
1− pm ≤ eǫp+ δ. (12)
This condition is clearly necessary as can be seen by considering the singleton
set A = {d}. To see that it is also sufficient let d, d′ ∈ D and A ⊆ D be given.
There are 4 cases to consider.
1. d, d′ /∈ A: Then P(Xd ∈ A) = P(Xd′ ∈ A) = p|A| and (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy holds trivially.
2. d, d′ ∈ A: Then P(Xd ∈ A) = P(Xd′ ∈ A) = p(|A| − 1) + 1 − pm =
p(|A| −m− 1) + 1 and (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy holds trivially.
3. d′ ∈ A, d /∈ A: Then P(Xd ∈ A) ≤ P(Xd′ ∈ A) and (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy holds trivially.
4. d ∈ A, d′ /∈ A: Then
P(Xd ∈ A) = p(|A| −m− 1) + 1
P(Xd′ ∈ A) = p|A|.
From (12), we have
1− pm ≤ eǫp+ δ
= eǫ(p|A| − p|A|+ p) + δ
≤ eǫp|A| − p(|A| − 1) + δ,
since |A| ≥ 1 (d ∈ A by hypothesis). Rearranging the above inequality, we
see that
p(|A| −m− 1) + 1 ≤ eǫ (p|A|) + δ.
Thus we can construct an (ǫ, δ)-differentially private mechanism of the form (7)
by choosing p ≥ 1−δm+eǫ .
6 Accuracy
In this section, we consider the question of accuracy for product sanitisations.
The literature on the interaction between privacy and accuracy is considerable
and previous work has considered examples such as count queries [19], contin-
gency table marginals [1] and spatial data [6]. As product sanitisations are
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constructed from 1-dimensional mechanisms, we focus on the error of these ba-
sic mechanisms here. These results can then be used to derive bounds for data
in Dn; the precise form these bounds will take depends on how the metric is
constructed on Dn.
We wish to emphasise two points about our work: we are considering a
very general class of databases that can incorporate numerical, categorical and
functional data; we consider (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy and are not assuming
δ = 0.
As ρ(·, d) is a continuous function on D for any fixed d, it is measurable with
respect to the Borel σ-algebra on D. It follows that ρ(Xd, d) is a nonnegative-
valued random variable. We define the maximal expected error E as:
E = max
d∈D
E [ρ(Xd, d)] . (13)
For r > 0 and x ∈ D, Br(x) denotes the open ball
Br(x) := {y ∈ D | ρ(y, x) < r}.
We first note that for any differentially private mechanism with δ < 1, E > 0.
If δ = 1, then any mechanism is differentially private.
Lemma 4 Let a family {Xd : Ω → U | d ∈ D} of measurable mappings be
given, let 0 ≤ δ < 1 and assume that
P(Xd ∈ A) ≤ e
ǫ
P(Xd′ ∈ A) + δ, (14)
for all d, d′ ∈ D,A ∈ AU . Then E > 0.
Proof: As D is compact, we can choose u, v in D with ρ(u, v) = diam(D).
Let r = diam(D)2 . Then from (14), it follows that
P(Xu ∈ Br(v)) ≥ e
−ǫ (P(Xv ∈ Br(v))− δ) .
As ρ(x, u) ≥ r > 0 for all x ∈ Br(v), it follows that E [ρ(Xu, u)] > 0 unless
P(Xv ∈ Br(v)) = δ. (15)
However, if this is the case then P(ρ(Xv, v) ≥ r) = 1 − δ > 0 and hence
E [ρ(Xv, v)] ≥ r(1 − δ) > 0. This completes the proof.
We now present two simple results giving lower bounds for E . The argument
for the following result is inspired by that used to establish Theorem 3.3 of [20].
Theorem 6 Let a family {Xd : Ω → U | d ∈ D} of measurable mappings
satisfying (14) be given. Then
E ≥ (1− δ)
(
diam(D)
2(1 + eǫ)
)
. (16)
Proof: Without loss of generality, we may assume that E is finite. More-
over, from Lemma 4 we know that E > 0. As D is compact, there exist points
u, v in D with ρ(u, v) = diam(D). Set t = diam(D)2E ; then tE =
diam(D)
2 and
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the balls BtE(u), BtE(v) are disjoint. From Markov’s inequality applied to the
non-negative random variable ρ(Xu, u), it follows that
P(Xu ∈ BtE(u)) ≥ 1−
1
t
= 1−
2E
diam(D)
. (17)
It is now immediate that
P(Xu ∈ BtE(v)) ≤
2E
diam(D)
. (18)
From (14) we know that
P(Xu ∈ BtE(v)) ≥ e
−ǫ(P(Xv ∈ BtE(v)) − δ). (19)
Combining (18), (19) and noting that (17) also holds with u replaced by v, we
see that
2E
diam(D)
≥ e−ǫ
(
1−
2E
diam(D)
− δ
)
and after a simple rearrangement of terms we see that
E ≥ (1− δ)
(
diam(D)
2(1 + eǫ)
)
,
as claimed.
The previous result applies to any compact metric space D. Now assume
that D is discrete so that there exists some κ > 0 such that
ρ(x, y) ≥ κ ∀x, y ∈ D. (20)
This combined with D being compact immediately implies that D is finite. A
straightforward alteration of the argument of Theorem 6 yields the following
result.
Theorem 7 Let D be finite with |D| = m+1 and κ = mind,d′∈D ρ(d, d′). Let a
family {Xd : Ω → U | d ∈ D} of measurable mappings be given satisfying (14).
Then
E ≥ (1− δ)
(
κm
(m+ eǫ)
)
(21)
Proof: It is trivial that the m+1 balls BtE(u), u ∈ D are all disjoint where
t = κE . Fix some u ∈ D. By the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 6,
P(Xu ∈ BtE(u)) ≥ 1−
E
κ
. (22)
Moreover, there must exist some v 6= u such that
P(Xu ∈ BtE(v)) ≤
E
κm
. (23)
Choose one such v and apply (14) to obtain
P(Xu ∈ BtE(v)) ≥ e
−ǫ (P(Xv ∈ BtE(v)) − δ) . (24)
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As in the proof of Theorem 6, we can now conclude that
E
κm
≥ e−ǫ
(
1−
E
κ
− δ
)
.
Rearranging this inequality gives us that
E ≥ (1 − δ)
(
κm
m+ eǫ
)
.
Example 7 Consider again Example 6. We have shown that there exists an
(ǫ, δ)-differentially private mechanism with p = 1−δm+eǫ where |D| = m + 1. If
D is equipped with the discrete metric so that ρ(d, d′) = 1 for all d 6= d′, then
κ = 1 and for any d, the expected value of ρ(Xd, d) for this mechanism is given
by ∑
d 6=d′
p = mp = (1− δ)
(
m
m+ eǫ
)
.
So the bound given by Theorem 7 is tight in this simple case.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have considered differential privacy in the setting of probability on met-
ric spaces with mechanisms viewed as measurable functions taking values in
output query spaces. We have demonstrated that this framework allows mecha-
nisms based on sanitisation and output perturbation to be treated in a uniform
manner; moreover we have presented examples to highlight that categorical,
functional and numerical data can be treated in this setting. For sanitisation
mechanisms, a formal proof that differential privacy with respect to the identity
query guarantees differential privacy with respect to any measurable query has
been given. We have also introduced the problem of determining sufficient sets
for differential privacy, shown that a generating algebra of sets is a sufficient
set and applied this fact to functional data in the space C([0, 1]) of continuous
functions on [0, 1]. In the latter half of the paper, we have focussed on product
sanitisations of the form (7); we have shown that these mechanisms are (ǫ, δ)-
differentially private if and only if the 1-dimensional mechanism used to define
them is. This result was then applied in two contexts: to provide a condition
for the well-known Laplacian mechanism to be differentially private; and to give
a simple example of a differentially private mechanism for discrete categorical
data. Finally in Section 6, two simple results giving lower bounds for the maxi-
mal expected error for (ǫ, δ) differentially private mechanisms on metric spaces
were presented.
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